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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of industrial productivity on transnationals M&As from 
OECD countries towards Latin American countries in the period 1996 to 2010. It also 
analyzes the relationship between external mechanism of corporate governance and 
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transnational M&As. For this purpose we use a gravitational model at the industry level. We 
find that industry productivity and higher standards of corporate governance in the country of 
origin promote transnational M&As activity. However, it is also found that higher levels of 
capital and technological productivity decreases transnational M&As activity. 
Keywords. Mergers and Acquisitions, Industry Productivity, Corporate Governance 
JEL Codes: F30, G34, L21 
Introduction 
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), due to constituting a complex phenomenon in 
both the reasons for them to take place and the impact in the resulting company, have been 
studied from different perspectives. Some studies have focused mainly on studying the 
determinants and the individual and strategic consequences of undertaking a merger and 
acquisition (Cortés, García, and Agudelo 2015; Harford 2002; Jarrel, Brickley, and Netter 
1988; Malmendier and Tate 2005; North 2001; Vasco et al. 2014; Wang and Xie 2006). 
Similarly, other studies have identified periods of concentration of M&As activity, known as 
M&As waves, which refers to the wave pattern followed by the M&As’ time series in both 
the number of deals and their value (Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, and Travlos 2012; Cortés, 
Agudelo, and Mongrut 2012; Golbe and White 1993; Gugler, Mueller, and Weichselbaumer 
2012; Martynova and Renneboog 2008b). 
Transnational M&As, that is, those for which the acquiring and acquired companies are 
established in difference countries, have recently been a focus of attention in the literature 
(Breuer and Salzmann 2011; Bris and Cabolis 2002; Graham, Martey, and Yawson 2008; 
Kim and Lu 2011; Martynova and Renneboog 2008a; Pablo 2009; Rossi and Volpin 2004). 
Some authors have focused their theoretical approaches and their study methodologies to treat 
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transnational M&As as a particular case of foreign direct investment (FDI). Considering 
transnational M&As as a particular case of FDI has important consequences, given that they 
are starting to gain more weight on international investment flows, representing up to 80% of 
total FDI (Hyun and Kim 2010). As such, these transactions have macroeconomic 
determinants that make them different from domestic M&As and, therefore, they must be 
studied independently. 
The pioneers in applying a gravitational model to analyze transnational M&As were Di 
Giovanni (2005) and Portes and Rey (2005). Later, Hyun and Kim (2010) revisited the 
gravitational model to conclude that institutional quality of the country promotes transnational 
M&As activity. The usage of the gravitational model to study transnational M&As, which 
was motivated as a consequence of analyzing this phenomenon as a particular case of FDI, 
has been given theoretical support by Head and Ries (2008) and Hijzen, Gorg and Manchin 
(2008). 
In this sense, this paper aims at verifying whether higher levels of industry productivity leads 
to a higher transnational M&As activity, directed from the OECD countries towards Latin 
America. Additionally, whether this activity is stimulated by the external mechanism of 
corporate governance of both countries. For this purpose, we employ a gravitational model at 
the industry level. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold: the approach regarding productivity 
and the usage of the gravitational model at the industry level. Modeling at the industry level 
can bring about additional inferences on the topic and can potentially open doors for future 
studies that include more determinants of this phenomenon. Other studies (eg. Andrade and 
Stafford 2004; Harford 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin 1996), propose and verify the relation 
between industry shocks and M&As activity. However, none of these studies consider 
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different measures of productivity and their relation with M&As as a particular case of FDI. 
Furthermore, the authors that have applied the gravitational model to transnationals M&As, 
have always done so at the country level (Di Giovanni 2005; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012; 
Head and Ries 2008; Hyun and Kim 2010; Portes and Rey 2005).1Finally, we measure 
industry productivity for each factor of production. That is, we identify the impact of labor, 
capital, and technological productivity on transnationals M&As. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Next section present the background and justifies 
the hypothesis tested. Methodology section describes the model, the data and the variables. 
Followed by the results and finally the conclusions of the study. 
Background and Hypothesis 
Industry Determinants 
Until now, all studies that have applied the gravitational model to transnational M&As have 
specified the model at the country level.2 However, in the international trade literature, where 
the model has been extensively developed, it is possible to find applications of different 
specifications of the gravitational equation at the industry level (Bergstrand 1989; Brainard 
1993). In the present study the relationship between industry productivity and transnational 
M&As activity through a gravitational model is established. 
There is evidence in the literature that indicates that higher industry productivity leads to 
higher levels of transnational M&As activity. According to Helpman, Melitz and Yealpe 
(2004), only the most productive firms are involved in international activities, and the more 
productive they are, the higher their preference towards FDI instead of exporting. This 
theoretical framework is also applied and verified by Damijan, Polanec and Prašnikar (2007), 
who found that greater capital intensity leads to higher propensity to invest abroad. Although 
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the previous studies are at the firm level, Pantelidis and Kyrikilis (2005) evaluate the factors 
that determine FDI in an economy. They found as the causes for investment activity: capital 
abundance (and therefore a lower marginal productivity of capital), differences among 
demand structures, competitive advantage (or technological productivity), human capital, 
currency appreciation, and the openness degree of the economy. 
Even though the previous studies establish the relation between industry productivity and 
FDI, the different approaches could be particularly applied to transnational M&As. As 
mentioned before, transnational M&As are one of the channels available of FDI, which is also 
becoming one of the most important. Additionally, it is well known that M&As are a 
mechanism to enter other markets, which is consistent with the hypothesis of Helpman, 
Melitz and Yealpe. (2004). 
Based on the literature we proposed the following hypothesis about the relation between 
industry productivity and transnational M&As. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of industry productivity leads to higher transnational M&As 
activity from OECD countries to Lantin American countries. 
Corporate governance 
Within the theoretical framework of Corporate Governance, the topic related to the market of 
corporate control has been one of the most widely discussed (Tirole 2005). Authors such as 
Jensen (1984; 1988; 1989a; 1989b), Jensen and Ruback (1983), among others, argue that the 
weakness in the corporate governance system in the 80s in the United States, is one of the 
possible causes for the growth of M&As. 
According to Denis and McConnel (2003), research in corporate governance started to 
develop in the United States during the decades of the 70s and 80s. But it was only until the 
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90s that this kind of research started to take place in other countries. From here two stages 
arise in the research: studies related to internal mechanisms of corporate governance and 
studies related to external mechanisms. Regarding internal mechanisms, Denis and McConnel 
contemplate the composition of the board of directors, ownership structure, etc. And for 
external mechanisms, the authors consider the takeover market, legal systems, etc. This is 
reinforced by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), who find that, in the case of less developed 
countries, variations in the indexes of corporate governance among firms are explained by 
country characteristics instead of own firm characteristics. 
The majority of empirical studies on M&As and corporate governance, both related to internal 
and external mechanisms, have focused on the effects of corporate governance on value 
creation (Bris and Cabolis 2002; Martynova and Renneboog 2008a; Wang and Xie 2006), the 
likelihood of carrying out a M&A or accepting an acquisition offer (Graham, Martey, and 
Yawson 2008; North 2001; Pombo and Corredor 2009), or the transfer of corporate 
governance standards from the acquiring firm to the acquired firm (Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis 
2008). 
A particular study that is in line with our research is Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012), who 
employed a gravitational model at the country level and found that the geographical distance, 
the quality of accounting information, and the level of bilateral trade are among some of the 
determinants of M&As activity between two countries. Additionally, the authors argue that it 
is likely that institutional characteristics at the country level are positively correlated with 
better corporate governance. However, they do not consider industry productivity as a 
determinant of M&As among countries. 
This leads to the following hypothesis about the relation between M&As and corporate 
governance. 
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Hypothesis 2: External mechanisms of corporate governance propitiate M&As activity from 
OECD countries to Latin American countries. 
Methodology 
The model 
The gravitational model was initially proposed as an empirical approach for the study of 
bilateral trade (Linnemann 1966; Tinbergen 2007). It was based on Newton’s gravity law, 
according to which the force of attraction between two bodies (in this case between 
international flows) is directly proportional to their masses (size of the economies) and 
inversely proportional to the distance between them (geographical separation or cultural 
distances), as it is described in equation 1. The log-log specification of this expression has 
boosted the empirical research on international commerce through econometric models. 
 𝐹𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1
𝑌𝑖
𝛽2𝑌𝑖
𝛽3
𝐷
𝑖𝑗
𝛽4
 (1) 
Later on, the model was given theoretical support by Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985), 
which allowed for the development of other specifications and the application of the model to 
different areas of study. The model has been applied, for example, to intra–industry trade 
(Bergstrand 1989; Bergstrand 1990), to explain the relation between unilateral and bilateral 
trade flows at the industry level (Brainard 1993), and to explore different measures of cultural 
distance (Tadesse and White 2008) and of common language (Melitz 2008). It has been 
applied as well to studies on migration (Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis 2000) and tourism 
(McAllister and Klett 1976). 
Among the different areas of international trade where the model has been applied, we find 
FDI to be one of them (De Mello-Sampayo 2007; MacDermott 2006; Páez 2008). Along the 
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same line, authors such as Portes and Rey (2005), Di Giovanni (2005), and Hyun and Kim 
(2010) have applied the gravitational model to transnationals M&As. However, it was Head 
and Ries (2008) and Hijzen, Görg and Manchin (2008) the ones who gave theoretical support 
to this model. 
Given the hypothesis of this study, the theoretical and empirical background of the 
gravitational model related to transnational M&As, and its potential application at the 
industry level, the proposed specification is the following: 
Count𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ln GDP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 (
Prod𝑖𝑘𝑡
GDP𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛽4 ln GDP𝑗𝑡  
+𝛽5 ln Dist𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6ComLang𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7RTA𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8TaxR𝑗𝑡 
+𝛽9CorpGov𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10CorpGov𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11PK𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽12PL𝑖𝑘𝑡 
+𝛽13PTech𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽14Open𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽15 ln Trade𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
Where 𝑖 is the country of origin, 𝑘 is the industry in the country of origin, 𝑗 is the destination 
country, 𝑡 is the year of the observation, Count is the number of M&As announcements, GDP 
is the gross domestic product in constant dollars of year 2000, Prod is the industry’s 
production, Dist is the geographical distance between the two countries, ComLang is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the official language between both countries is the 
same, RTA is a dummy variable that indicates whether there is a current trade agreement 
between the two countries, TaxR is the nominal corporate tax rate on profits, CorpGov is an 
indicator of corporate governance standards, PK is a measure of capital productivity, PL is a 
measure of labor productivity, PTech is a measure of technological productivity, Open is an 
openness measure, and Trade is the amount of bilateral trade. 
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Data 
Transnational M&As announcements are extracted from the Thomson One database for the 
period 1996 to 2010. It is only taken announcements that have as country of destination 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico or Peru; and as country of origin any member of 
the OECD, excluding Chile and Mexico. Additionally, we exclude as well hostile takeovers, 
privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations and repurchases. Announcements 
of industries with special regulations are also not taken into consideration, such as: 
transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary 
services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. Finally, it is 
only considered those announcements for which the purpose was to acquire 5% or more of the 
share ownership, out of which a total of 3,592 announcements are obtained. Given that a big 
part of the data come from the national accounts, the announcements are reclassified from SIC 
to ISIC Rev. 3, and grouped at the two digits level.3 
Table 1 shows the composition of announcements in the sample by industry and year, without 
distinguishing the origin or destination country. It shows that almost three fourths of the 
announcements are concentrated in the first seven industries, that is, mining, rent of 
machinery, food products, chemicals and chemical services, machinery and equipment, and 
wholesale and retail trade. It is possible to identify as well periods of activity concentration, 
something that has already been documented for Latin America (Cortés, Agudelo, and 
Mongrut 2012), that is, a wave in the period 1997 to 2000, and another in 2007 to 2010. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The composition by country, as shown in Table 2, is highly concentrated in the country of 
origin, and no so much in the destination country. Around 80% of the total of announcements 
comes from five countries: United States, Canada, Spain, France, and England. The 
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concentration of horizontal M&As announcements is also high, although Canada represents 
the majority of announcements. This is because most of the announcements that come from 
Canadian companies in the mining industry are of horizontal type. Table 2 also indicates that 
the announcements are concentrated in those economies of bigger size, for both origin and 
destination countries. This validates one of the assumptions of the gravitational model for the 
selected sample. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The data for the GDP at the country level is taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database at constant dollars of year 2000, while geographical 
distances and language is obtained from the GeoDist database of the CEPII institute. Nominal 
corporate tax rates on profits in the destination country is acquired from the Corporate & 
Indirect Tax Survey 2011 of the firm KPMG. The information on national accounts at the 
industry level from the country of origin is obtained from the STAN Database for Structural 
Analysis of the OECD. The monetary values are deflated using the corresponding deflator 
available from the database, and posteriorly converted to dollars of year 2000. With this 
information it is calculated the weight of the industry within the country (
Prod𝑖𝑘𝑡
GDP𝑖𝑡
), as well as 
the different indicators of industry productivity. 
Different measures are employed for capital productivity (PK). One of the measures is the real 
interest rate, under the assumption that producers maximize their profits when the marginal 
productivity of capital is equal to its cost, that is, the real interest rate. According to this, we 
use the interest rate on loans in the country of origin, obtained from the World Development 
Indicators database, and subtracting from it the implicit inflation in the industry deflator. 
Other calculated measures employed in this study are industry’s production and value added 
over its stock of capital. Similar to capital productivity, different measures are used for labor 
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productivity. Under the same profit maximization assumption, in which the marginal 
productivity of labor is equal to its cost, that is wages, we calculate the wage for the industry 
by dividing the labor cost over the number of employees. It is also calculated the value added 
of the industry divided by labor costs, the number of employees, and the working hours. 
Similarly, different measures of technological productivity are employed at the country and 
industry levels. At the country level, we calculate the number of patent requests divided by: 
the number of people dedicated to research and development, number of people with tertiary 
education, total population, and total production. The number of patents for the country and 
the data on population are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators database. At 
the industry level, we calculate the expenditure on research and development over total 
production and over the stock of capital. Research and development expenditures are taken 
from the STAN R&D Expenditure in Industry database of the OECD. 
The corporate governance variables are at the macro level given that the gravitational model, 
by definition, has an aggregated specification. According to the literature presented in the 
background section, these measures correspond to external mechanisms of corporate 
governance. There exist empirical findings that suggest that in less developed countries the 
greatest proportion in the variation of individual standards of corporate governance are 
explained by own country characteristics and not by firm characteristics (Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz 2007). For this reason, we employ the Kaufmann variables, which are at the country 
level, time varying and constructed from a model of unobservable components with 
perceptual information from different sources on governance and institutionality (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). The institutional environment that captures these variables, 
according to Daniel, Cieslewicz, and Pourjalali (2011), determines the practices of corporate 
governance. 
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We also take two of the La Porta’s indicators. The first one is the anti-director rights, which 
is a measure of protection for the minority shareholders based on legal mechanisms and it is 
related to voting rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998). The second one is the 
anti-self-dealing index, which measures the level of stockholders protection against tunneling 
transactions (Djankov et al. 2008). 
Given that Kaufmann indicators are six, and that anti-director rights and anti-self-dealing 
index indicators are also available, an analysis of principal components is performed in order 
to construct a latent variable of corporate governance. This procedure allows us to gather in 
one single variable a big part of the different elements that are related to institutions, laws, 
codes and customs that determine the countries’ practices of corporate governance. Besides, it 
allows us to take advantage of the cross sectional differences of the La Porta variables with 
the time varying Kaufmann indicators.4 The results show that the first component captures 
around 68% of the total indicators variability. The average across time of the first results, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, shows a clear advantage of the OECD countries over their Latin 
American counter parts in terms of corporate governance standards. Among Latin American 
countries, Chile stands up above the others, with a corporate governance level similar to that 
of OECD countries. The countries with the lowest levels of corporate governance are Peru 
and Colombia. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The variable Open𝑖𝑘𝑡 measures the level of economic openness of the industry. It is calculated 
as the sum of industry exports and imports, divided by its total production (Chuang and Lin 
1999). This data is also available in the STAN Database for Structural Analysis. The variable 
Trade𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the amount of bilateral trade from the industry in the destination country towards 
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the country of origin. This information is taken from the World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) database of the World Bank. 
Table 3 summarizes the expected signs of each of the variables in the model, according to the 
presented theoretical framework and previous empirical findings. With respect to the GDP of 
the destination and origin countries, it is expected a positive sign, given that it represents one 
of the fundamentals of the gravitational model. Similarly, it is expected that distance has a 
negative sign. Common language should promote M&As activity. In the international trade 
literature, this variable has been widely used and has been interpreted as a measure of cultural 
distance. Within the transnational M&As framework, this variable can be interpreted as a 
measure of the costs of doing business (Di Giovanni 2005) and costs of inspection (Head and 
Ries 2008). 
It is expected that the presence of a trade agreement discourages transnational M&As activity, 
that is, that its sign is negative, contrary to international trade models. This is because the 
takeover market is a substitute of international trade. On the other hand, the effect of the 
earnings corporate tax rate is not completely clear. Some countries, in particular the emerging 
ones, have adopted tax relief policies in order to attract FDI (Hines Jr. 2001), and so it could 
be expected that higher tax rates discourage transnational M&As activity. However, it is 
documented that many times the empirical findings are contradictory (Hines Jr. 1997). With 
respect to corporate governance variables, it is expected that they have a positive sign, as it is 
argued in our hypothesis. In order to verify this result, additional robustness tests are 
performed. 
In line with the hypothesis of this study, it is also expected that the sign of the different 
productivity measures is positive. This is the case, for example, for the labor and 
technological productivity. However, in the case of capital productivity, the neoclassical 
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theory proposes that investment is encouraged under the presence of high marginal 
productivity of capital, which occurs when the interest rate is high and there is low intensity 
in the usage of capital. Therefore, in line with this observation and the findings in studies 
related to FDI (Damijan et al. 2007; Helpman et al. 2004) we expect to find that in industries 
with high capital abundance, low marginal productivity of capital and low interest rates, there 
is more propensity to invest in foreign countries in the form of transnational M&As, and so 
we expect the sign of this variable to be negative. 
Finally, it is expected that the sign of the openness variable is negative, for the same reason of 
the trade agreements variable: the lack of trade openness is an a priori barrier for the 
development of international trade, and so it is substituted by the takeover market. The 
difference between the two variables is that bilateral agreements reflect only the subscription 
of a treaty, while trade openness reflects how much the different agents in the economy take 
advantage of such agreements. And regarding the trade level between the industry in the 
country of origin and the destination country, it is expected that it encourages M&As activity, 
after controlling for trade agreements and openness, given that if the bilateral relation is high, 
it is due to less frictions for business development among the two. 
Results 
Main results 
Table 4 shows the results from the econometric model estimation following two different 
methodologies: negative binomial of random effects panel data (NB, column 2), taking as 
dependent variable the number of transnational M&As announcements (Count𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡), due to 
this being a count variable; and a Tobit of random effects panel data (column 1), taking as 
dependent variable the transformation ln(1 + Count𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡). The results support the idea that the 
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gravitational model at the industry level is applicable to transnational M&As. The greater the 
origin and destination countries’ sizes (lnGDP𝑖𝑡 and lnGDP𝑗𝑡), the greater is the number of 
transnational M&As announcements. It is observed that the coefficients are not too different 
comparing both estimation methodologies. It is also confirmed that the greater the size of the 
industry relative to the size of the economy in the country of origin, the greater is the number 
of transnational M&As announcements. 
As proposed in hypothesis 1, the higher the labor productivity, the higher the number of 
transnational M&As announcements. The sign of the variable Wage𝑖𝑘𝑡 is positive and 
statistically significant under both estimation methods. This indicates that in industries with 
high salaries and high labor productivity, companies try to penetrate foreign markets through 
the takeover market. The result is in line with the findings of Helpman, Melitz and Yealpe. 
(2004), who state that the most productive firms are the ones involved in international 
activities. 
Regarding the marginal productivity of capital, it is confirmed that there is an inverse relation 
with transnational M&As activity, as the associated coefficient of the variable 
Interest Rate𝑖𝑘𝑡 is negative and highly significant, and robust under the two estimation 
approaches. This indicates that in industries with low interest rates, high capital abundance 
(Damijan, Polanec, and Prašnikar 2007; Harford 2005; Pantelidis and Kyrkilis 2005), and 
depletion of the installed capacity (Andrade and Stafford 2004), firms try to grow or expand 
through the takeover market. Contrary to the expected, the variable Patent𝑖𝑡/
(R&D Personnel) of technological productivity has a negative sign, and is statistically 
significant and robust under both estimation methodologies. It is expected a positive relation 
between technological productivity and transnational M&As activity, however, it should be 
clarified that previous studies have found the same unexpected results on this variable 
(Pantelidis and Kyrkilis 2005). 
16 
With respect to hypothesis 2, the variables related to corporate governance, for both the 
country of origin (CorpGov𝑖𝑡) and the destination country (CorpGov𝑗𝑡), are statistically 
significant and indicate a positive relation with transnational M&As activity. This implies that 
the external mechanisms of corporate governance, that is, the laws and conventions that 
determine the governance institutional practices of the countries (Denis and McConnell 
2003), as well as the general level of investors protection (Djankov et al. 2008; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998), promote foreign investment through transnational 
M&As. 
Last, the results related to the control variables are, in general terms, as expected. The variable 
for cultural distance or inspection costs (ComLang𝑖𝑗) is positive and statistically significant, 
which indicates that if two countries share the same language, transnational M&As activity 
would be encouraged. The variable for trade agreements (RTA𝑖𝑗𝑡) is negative and significant, 
contrary to the findings of Hyun and Kim (2010), which can be interpreted as the takeover 
market being a substitute of the goods and services market in the absence of trade agreements 
(Di Giovanni 2005). On the other hand, although the variable for the corporate tax rate in the 
destination country (TaxR𝑗𝑡) presents a positive sign, contrary to the expected, this is not at all 
surprising given similar findings in previous studies (Hines Jr. 1997). Trade openness 
(Open𝑖𝑘𝑡) has negative sign but it is only significant in one of the estimations; and bilateral 
trade (lnTrade𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑡) is also significant with a positive sign, as expected. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, the results of the negative binomial and Tobit estimations are 
presented, but considering as control variable the logarithm of industry’s production in the 
country of origin (Prod𝑖𝑘𝑡GDP𝑖𝑡) instead of total country’s GDP. The results support the idea 
that the greater the size of the industry, the greater the transnational M&As activity. The signs 
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and significance of the other variables do not present major differences, with the exception of 
technological productivity, openness, and bilateral trade, which lose statistical significance. 
Robustness tests 
Table 5 and 6 present the model estimations using alternative productivity variables through 
the negative binomial estimation methodology.5 Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5 show the results of 
the additional variables for labor productivity: the logarithm of salary (Wage𝑖𝑘𝑡), the 
logarithm of the industry value added over labor costs (ln(VA/Labor Costs)𝑖𝑘𝑡), the 
logarithm of the industry value added over the number of employees (ln(VA/
Number of employees)𝑖𝑘𝑡), and the logarithm of the industry value added over the number of 
working hours (ln(VA/Number of hours)𝑖𝑘𝑡). The results are consistent with the previous 
ones, in the sense that labor productivity promotes transnational M&As activity. Additionally, 
the variables are statistically significant.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 describe the results for the additional variables related to capital 
productivity: the logarithm of production over the industry’s capital stock (ln(Prod/
Capital Stock)𝑖𝑘𝑡), and the logarithm of the value added over the industry’s capital stock 
(ln(VA/Capital Stock)𝑖𝑘𝑡). However, the results are not statistically significant, although the 
same sign is preserved, just as for the variable real interest rate. 
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 6 describe the results for the additional variables related to 
technological productivity: patents of the country of origin over population with tertiary 
education (Patents𝑖𝑗/Tertiary ed. people), industry’s research and development expenditures 
over production (R&D expend.𝑖𝑘𝑡/Prod𝑖𝑘𝑡), and the number of patents per capita of the 
country. The negative sign obtained before is persistent in these estimations as well. However, 
only patents over population with tertiary education and patents per capita turn out to be 
statistically significant.  
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Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present an alternative measure for the corporate 
governance standards in the country of origin. Instead of using the latent variable (which is 
constructed with the Kaufmann and La Porta’s indicators), we take the Institutional 
Shareholders Services (ISS) indicators for all companies that are traded in the stock market 
and that belong to the studied industries.6 The average of the individual indicators is 
calculated at the industry and country levels.7 Column 5 and 6 show the results for the 
variable at the country and industry level, respectively. The results confirm that the better the 
corporate governance standards in the country or industry of origin, the greater is the number 
of announcements of transnational M&As. 
Conclusions 
The present study examines the impact of industry productivity on transnational M&As 
activity from OECD countries to Latin American countries in the period 1996 to 2010. The 
results show that the gravitational model at the industry level is applicable to the analysis of 
transnational M&As. Just as it is predicted in the literature, we find a positive relation 
between the size of the origin and destination countries and the number of transnational M&A 
announcements. 
Additionally, we find that the productivity variables of the destination country explain the 
level of transnational M&A activity. However, not all variables support the idea that the 
greater the productivity, the greater the number of M&As. In particular, the productivity of 
capital presents an inverse relation and it is highly significant, which could be justified by the 
fact that firms in countries with high capital abundance try to expand their activities abroad 
through the takeover international market. Finally, we find that the external mechanisms of 
corporate governance, for both the origin and destination countries, foster an institutional 
environment that propitiates the presence of transnational M&As. 
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Future research of M&A activity in Latin America may wish to focus on study the 
determinant of transnational M&As having into account the industry integration involved for 
example vertical, horizontal or diversification. Second the study of agency problems involved 
in the M&A deals using internal mechanisms of corporate governance. 
Notes 
1 The only exception, to our knowledge, is Hijzen, Görg and Manchin (2008) who specify a  
model at the industry level to contrast the hypothesis of tariff-jumping. 
2 To our knowledge, the only theoretical and empirical model at the industry level has been 
developed by Hijzen, Görg and Manchin (2008). 
3 In this way, it is possible to obtain 33 industries from 32 destination countries to 6 countries 
of origin, during a period of 15 years, which allows to generate a total of 95,040 
possible observations. However, most of the announcements are concentrated in a few 
countries of origin and their respective industries, because of which, out of the 95,040 
observations, 93,155 take a value of zero. 
4 For a formal definition of the construction of latent variables based on the analysis of 
principle components, see Lynn and McCulloch (2000). 
5 It is also estimated through Tobit, and the results are not qualitatively different. 
6 A vast quantity of corporate governance studies has used these indicators, including studies 
on external mechanisms of corporate governance (Aggarwal et al. 2009; Bruno and 
Claessens 2010; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007). 
7 An unpaired t test is performed for the median, and it shows that in a big part of the 
countries and industries there are statistically significant differences among each other. 
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Table 1. Transnational M&As announcements per industry of origin and year   
Industry 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total %
Mining and quarrying except energy producing materials 19 15 22 6 12 19 31 71 57 35 88 165 138 132 192 1002 28%
Renting of mach. and other business activities 9 12 26 47 60 33 14 8 7 9 21 40 27 28 45 386 11%
Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials 16 15 8 6 20 9 15 17 19 16 37 34 34 49 52 347 10%
Food products 26 17 27 14 30 22 13 11 20 12 18 22 28 17 10 287 8%
Chemicals and chemical products 25 17 18 21 23 18 4 6 7 12 8 19 10 11 20 219 6%
Machinery and equipment 17 21 20 17 17 13 5 4 8 10 12 20 21 15 13 213 6%
Wholesale and retail trade 7 19 18 17 15 15 12 4 12 10 11 12 6 13 9 180 5%
Printing and publishing 1 1 9 11 19 9 4 3 4 5 9 14 5 3 14 111 3%
Pulp 8 8 13 7 11 8 2 7 6 1 4 0 5 4 1 85 2%
Other non-metallic mineral products 5 9 15 13 12 5 3 0 5 1 3 4 5 2 2 84 2%
Fabricated metal products 5 6 10 5 9 6 1 3 3 3 6 4 9 7 5 82 2%
Construction 0 3 5 6 4 5 2 5 4 5 8 7 12 7 6 79 2%
Electrical machinery and apparatus 2 7 9 7 7 7 3 1 7 1 3 4 8 2 4 72 2%
Coke 7 4 5 9 10 4 4 2 1 3 5 2 1 0 2 59 2%
Basic metals 1 1 1 1 7 2 4 2 1 6 3 8 5 6 7 55 2%
Hotels and restaurants 5 2 3 9 5 3 1 4 5 2 7 5 1 0 2 54 2%
Textiles 1 1 13 3 5 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 49 1%
Other community 0 5 8 3 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 5 38 1%
Radio 1 2 3 2 7 3 4 2 0 0 1 4 5 1 2 37 1%
Agriculture 2 3 6 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 3 1 1 3 29 1%
Rubber and plastics products 2 4 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 3 0 2 2 1 23 1%
Medical 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 2 0 4 1 4 23 1%
Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling 0 1 3 4 1 1 0 5 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 22 1%
Leather 1 5 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 20 1%
Office 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 11 0%
Wearing apparel 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0%
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 1 6 0%
Wood and products of wood and cork 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 0%
Motor vehicles 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0%
Other transport equipment 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0%
Post and telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0%
Electricity and gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Real estate activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Total 2158 2180 2251 2216 2283 2193 2135 2168 2178 2147 2263 2387 2344 2322 2412 3592 100%  
The table shows the transnational M&As announcements per industry of origin and year from the OECD countries to six Latin American countries, as reported by 
Thomson One, in the period 1996 and 2010. The following deals were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual 
sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired.
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Table 2. Transnational M&As announcements per county of origin and year 
ARG BRA CHL COL MEX PER Total % ARG BRA CHL COL MEX PER Total %
USA 206 401 95 60 352 58 1172 33% 92 135 41 34 155 23 480 30%
CAN 115 143 116 78 432 179 1063 30% 56 71 50 51 269 100 597 37%
ESP 70 59 30 16 50 9 234 7% 31 28 14 9 23 5 110 7%
FRA 54 114 16 14 20 0 218 6% 15 42 6 8 6 0 77 5%
GBR 41 67 14 12 34 16 184 5% 23 18 2 7 14 8 72 4%
AUS 8 47 37 5 10 18 125 3% 5 20 14 2 1 6 48 3%
NLD 22 32 12 8 19 4 97 3% 14 17 4 4 9 1 49 3%
DEU 15 51 6 0 22 1 95 3% 6 13 3 0 6 0 28 2%
ITA 13 38 2 2 3 0 58 2% 4 18 2 1 1 0 26 2%
CHE 10 23 1 9 10 3 56 2% 3 6 1 3 5 1 19 1%
SWE 10 21 6 5 10 1 53 1% 7 8 2 5 6 1 29 2%
JPN 2 23 3 1 7 1 37 1% 0 6 2 0 3 0 11 1%
PRT 1 26 2 0 0 0 29 1% 1 18 2 0 0 0 21 1%
DNK 4 14 3 0 7 0 28 1% 2 6 3 0 3 0 14 1%
NOR 3 15 9 0 1 0 28 1% 1 6 0 0 0 0 7 0%
FIN 1 11 2 1 3 0 18 1% 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 0%
BEL 2 11 0 0 2 2 17 0% 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0%
AUT 3 8 1 0 3 0 15 0% 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 0%
NZL 3 2 4 1 5 0 15 0% 2 0 1 0 1 0 4 0%
IRL 1 7 1 0 4 0 13 0% 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 0%
ISR 1 10 0 0 1 0 12 0% 0 5 0 0 1 0 6 0%
LUX 4 5 0 0 2 0 11 0% 0 1 0 0 2 0 3 0%
KOR 2 0 0 0 2 1 5 0% 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0%
GRC 1 0 0 0 2 1 4 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
HUN 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
ISL 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0% 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0%
POL 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0% 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0%
TUR 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
CZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
EST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
SVK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
SVN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Total 592 1130 362 212 1001 295 3592 100% 263 428 148 124 509 145 1617 100%
% 16% 31% 10% 6% 28% 8% 100% 16% 26% 9% 8% 31% 9% 100%
All announcements Horizontal announcements
Countries
 
The table shows the transnational M&As announcements per country of origin and year from the OECD countries to 
six Latin American countries, as reported by Thomson One, in the period 1996 and 2010. The following deals were 
excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and 
repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, finance, insurance and 
real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public administration. c) 
Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired.  
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Table 3. Variable definition and expected signs 
Variable  Measure 
Expected 
sign 
ln GDP
it
, ln GDP
jt
 Gross domestic product, 
acquirer and target 
country 
Log of GDP at constant dollars   
ln Dist
ij
  Geographical distance Kilometers of geographical 
distance between countries 
  
Prod
GDP
ikt
it
 
 
 
  
Weight of industry 
production in GDP 
Industry production at constant 
dollars over GDP 
  
ComLang
ij
  Common language Dummy variable   
RTA
ijt
  Regional trade agreement Dummy variable   
TaxR
jt
  Corporate income tax rate Rate ? 
CorpGov
it
, 
CorpGov
jt
 
Corporate governance 
index 
Latent variable of Kaufmann, La 
Porta et al and Djankov et al 
variables 
  
PL
ikt
  Labor productivity Wage, value added over labor 
costs, value added per employee, 
value added per hour worked 
  
PK
ikt
  Capital productivity Real interest rate, production 
over capital stock and value 
added over capital stock 
  
PTech
ikt
  Technology productivity Patent applications over R&D 
personnel, patent application over 
labor force with tertiary 
education, patent applications 
over production, patent 
applications per capita, R&D 
expenditure over production and 
R&D expenditure over capital 
stock 
  
Open
ikt
  Openness to international 
trade 
Exports plus imports over 
production 
  
Trade
ikjt
  Bilateral trade Exports from origin industry to 
target country 
  
The table summarizes the expected signs of each of the variables of the model, according to the theoretical 
framework presented and previous empirical findings.  
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Table 4. Gravitational model results of transnational M&As activity 
Tobit NB Tobit NB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ln (1 + Count ikjt) Count ikjt ln (1 + Count ikjt) Count ikjt
ln GDPi 0.8228*** 1.1471***
(0.1326) (0.1781)
Prodikt/GDPit 10.3746*** 10.5428**
(2.8549) (3.6778)
ln Prodik 0.5919*** 0.6813***
(0.0892) (0.1128)
ln GDPj 0.3975*** 0.4287** 0.4440*** 0.4526***
(0.1032) (0.1338) (0.1057) (0.1363)
ln Dist ij -0.6325* -1.1437** -1.0053*** -1.7576***
(0.3152) (0.4097) (0.3038) (0.4058)
ComLangij 0.7217** 0.7259* 0.7352** 0.6596*
(0.2344) (0.3144) (0.2378) (0.3197)
RTAijt -0.3815* -0.5136* -0.3725* -0.4821*
(0.1657) (0.2283) (0.1662) (0.2297)
TaxRjt 0.0767*** 0.0883** 0.0751*** 0.0881**
(0.0216) (0.0279) (0.0216) (0.028)
Corporate governance
CorpGovit 0.4853*** 0.6793*** 0.3183* 0.4175*
(0.1423) (0.1914) (0.1303) (0.1761)
CorpGovjt 0.3995*** 0.5933*** 0.4281*** 0.6538***
(0.099) (0.1295) (0.0995) (0.1299)
Labor productivity
Wageikt 6.6094** 7.3803** 5.1901* 5.8496*
(2.2047) (2.558) (2.2332) (2.6203)
Capital Productivity
Interest rateikt -0.0057** -0.0091*** -0.0078*** -0.0110***
(0.002) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Technology productivity
Patentsit/R&D personnel -4.5905** -8.0757*** -0.9328 -2.4055
(1.7266) (2.3104) (1.4391) (2.0035)
Openikt -0.0935 -0.3256** 0.0085 -0.1515
(0.0621) (0.125) (0.0458) (0.1262)
ln Tradeikjt 0.1037*** 0.1625*** 0.0452 0.0920*
(0.0301) (0.0413) (0.0313) (0.0432)
_cons -35.6457*** -40.0181*** -23.7013*** -18.1536**
(6.2486) (7.9779) (4.7645) (5.9329)
N 8551 8551 8551 8551
N_lc 8222 8222
N_unc 329 329
Log likelihood -1258.276 -1348.1554 -1257.4023 -1352.5661
AIC 2550.552 2730.3107 2546.8047 2737.1321  
The table reports the gravitational model results of transnational M&As activity from OECD countries to six Latin 
American countries, as it is reported by Thomson One between 1996 and 2010. The model was estimated following 
two methodologies: (NB) Negative Binomial of random effects panel data, columns (2) and (4), taking as dependent 
variable the number of transnational M&As announcements (𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒕). (Tobit) Tobit of random effects panel data, 
columns (1) and (2), taking as dependent variables the transformation 𝐥𝐧(𝟏 + 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒕). The following 
announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, 
finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public 
administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The variables definition is shown in 
Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.  Robustness tests. Alternative measure of labor and capital productivity 
 
The table reports the gravitational model results of transnational M&As activity from OECD countries to six Latin 
American countries, as it is reported by Thomson One between 1996 and 2010. The model was estimated using (NB) 
Negative Binomial of random effects panel data, taking as dependent variable the number of transnational M&As 
announcements (𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒕). The alternative variables are presented as follows: columns (1) to (4) contain the 
variables related to labor productivity, and columns (5) and (6) those related to capital productivity. The following 
announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, leverage buyouts, spin-offs, 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt
ln GDPi 1.1360*** 1.0290*** 0.9633*** 1.0970*** 1.0921*** 1.0664***
(0.178) (0.1697) (0.1636) (0.2839) (0.2119) (0.2103)
Prodikt/GDPit 10.3092** 9.9925** 3.5363 -0.8478 15.9678*** 15.1323***
(3.6699) (3.7539) (3.2605) (4.7466) (4.1071) (4.1413)
ln GDPj 0.4272** 0.4080** 0.4493*** 0.4555* 0.6446*** 0.6375***
(0.1335) (0.1301) (0.1241) (0.1913) (0.1653) (0.1662)
ln Dist ij -1.1471** -1.2798** -0.7330* -0.1099 -3.0760* -3.1257*
(0.4084) (0.4059) (0.3641) (0.5179) (1.2781) (1.2804)
ComLangij 0.7359* 0.5974 0.8848** -0.0813 0.7416* 0.7750*
(0.3136) (0.3178) (0.3027) (0.4765) (0.345) (0.3453)
RTAijt -0.5169* -0.4808* -0.5974** -0.189 -0.7857** -0.7931**
(0.2282) (0.2192) (0.2219) (0.335) (0.2465) (0.2465)
TaxRjt 0.0888** 0.0995*** 0.0742** 0.0174 0.1690*** 0.1677***
(0.0279) (0.0267) (0.026) (0.0369) (0.0346) (0.0346)
Corporate governance
CorpGovit 0.6719*** 0.4725** 0.5248** -0.0281 0.4783* 0.5434*
(0.1909) (0.1827) (0.1822) (0.362) (0.2266) (0.2354)
CorpGovjt 0.5950*** 0.6385*** 0.4863*** 0.2188 0.9790*** 0.9748***
-0.1295 -0.1249 -0.1201 -0.1707 -0.1687 -0.1689
Labor productivity
Wageikt 6.8375 3.8132
(4.081) (3.2191)
ln Wageikt 8.9118**
(2.9235)
ln (VA/Labor costs)ikt 2.6426***
(0.4884)
ln (VA/Number of employees)ikt 0.9481***
(0.1283)
ln (VA/Number of hours)ikt 1.0959***
(0.2357)
Capital Productivity
Interest rateikt -0.0092*** -0.0038 -0.0084*** -0.0112***
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0032)
ln (Prod/Capital stock)ikt -6.7531
(3.4795)
ln (VA/Capital stock)ikt -11.6727
(6.5677)
Technology productivity
Patentsit/R&D personnel -7.9673*** -5.8402** -5.5081* -15.9673** -7.5332** -7.2206**
(2.3057) (2.242) (2.2248) (5.0433) (2.7847) (2.7709)
Openikt -0.3321** -0.2455* -0.3957*** -0.2179 0.0266 0.0383
(0.1253) (0.1201) (0.1179) (0.1773) (0.049) (0.0483)
ln Tradeikjt 0.1635*** 0.2105*** 0.2225*** 0.1682** 0.1891*** 0.2022***
(0.0412) (0.0446) (0.0395) (0.0555) (0.0525) (0.0545)
_cons -39.6928*** -40.0985*** -35.9457*** -46.4962*** -5.8267 8.4095
(7.9611) (7.5858) (7.3621) (12.9261) (17.8086) (23.5687)
N 8551 9301 9051 4177 6763 6733
Log likelihood -1347.7021 -1428.0055 -1434.8924 -780.9986 -828.217 -828.4028
AIC 2729.4042 2890.011 2903.7849 1595.9973 1690.4339 1690.8056
Capital productivityLabor productivity
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recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: transportation and public services, 
finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, mutual organizations and public 
administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The variables definition is shown in 
Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table 6. Robustness tests. Alternative measure of technology productivity and corporate governance standards 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt Count ikjt
ln GDPi 0.9101*** 0.5521** 0.5077* 0.9361*** 0.6630*** 0.7368***
(0.1492) (0.1732) (0.2029) (0.1523) (0.1858) (0.2087)
Prodikt/GDPit 10.3831** 9.3176* 10.2250* 10.4848** 10.8200** 7.9178
(3.5792) (4.3833) (5.1079) (3.5704) (3.7022) (4.501)
ln GDPj 0.4714*** 0.4763** 0.4204* 0.4873*** 0.3778** 0.4774**
(0.1318) (0.1602) (0.2131) (0.1322) (0.1324) (0.1685)
ln Dist ij -0.8765* -1.0947* -4.0432* -0.8063 -1.7230*** -1.5811***
(0.4215) (0.4371) (1.6119) (0.4344) (0.3842) (0.4737)
ComLangij 0.5305 0.6969* 0.8271* 0.5183 0.5164 0.7929
(0.3163) (0.3128) (0.3986) (0.3171) (0.3052) (0.504)
RTAijt -0.4513* -0.8324** -0.8936** -0.4035 -0.4932* -0.3962
(0.2227) (0.2708) (0.3158) (0.223) (0.2295) (0.2851)
TaxRjt 0.0836** 0.1708*** 0.1930*** 0.0802** 0.0999*** 0.0406
(0.0272) (0.033) (0.0436) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0332)
Corporate governance
CorpGovit 0.6847*** 0.1765 0.0626 0.8097***
(0.1842) (0.1801) (0.2395) (0.199)
CorpGovjt 0.5747*** 0.8314*** 0.9375*** 0.5566*** 0.6854*** 0.4524**
(0.1285) (0.1547) (0.2322) (0.1297) (0.1276) (0.1503)
CorpGov (ISS)it 0.0284*
(0.0113)
CorpGov (ISS)jt 0.0227*
(0.0097)
Labor productivity
Wageikt 7.2010** 5.5176 5.9517* 7.3624** 7.6026** 2.5345
(2.5357) (2.8726) (2.9776) (2.5302) (2.5591) (6.0284)
Capital Productivity
Interest rateikt -0.0092*** -0.0053 -0.0059 -0.0092*** -0.0090*** -0.0071**
(0.0023) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Technology productivity
Patentsit/R&D personnel -4.5831* -6.6437*
(2.1521) (2.8293)
Patentsit/Tertiary ed. People -0.2612***
(0.0762)
R&D expend.ikt/Prodikt -4.457
(4.2489)
R&D expend.ikt/Capital stockikt -2.4145
(2.3836)
Patents per cápita it -2568.3298***
(755.4227)
Openikt -0.3126** -0.8326*** -0.6487* -0.3059** -0.3105* -0.3503*
(0.1189) (0.2092) (0.2579) (0.1187) (0.1253) (0.1476)
ln Tradeikjt 0.1562*** 0.2974*** 0.2495** 0.1545*** 0.1519*** 0.0435
(0.0401) (0.0682) (0.0886) (0.04) (0.041) (0.0489)
_cons -36.9133*** -27.9200*** 1.616 -38.9705*** -19.6656** -21.6328**
(7.6164) (7.8929) (18.1729) (7.9683) (6.5684) (7.7775)
N 9064 6292 3144 9064 8551 3575
Log likelihood -1395.0859 -876.5684 -553.0827 -1395.278 -1351.3032 -879.3412
AIC 2824.1717 1787.1367 1140.1655 2824.5561 2736.6064 1792.6824
Technology productivity Corporate governance
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The table reports the gravitational model results of transnational M&As activity from OECD countries to six Latin 
American countries, as it is reported by Thomson One between 1996 and 2010. The model was estimated using (NB) 
Negative Binomial of random effects panel data taking as dependent variable the number of transnational M&As 
announcements (𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝒊𝒌𝒋𝒕). The alternative variables are presented as follows: columns (1) to (4) contain the 
variables related to technological productivity, and columns (5) and (6) those related to corporate governance 
standards. The following announcements were excluded from the sample: a) Hostile takeovers, privatizations, 
leverage buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, and repurchases. b) Industries with special regulations, such as: 
transportation and public services, finance, insurance and real state, individual sanitary services, education services, 
mutual organizations and public administration. c) Announcements in which less than 5% was being acquired. The 
variables definition is shown in Tables 3. The standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figura 1. Corporate governance latent variable measure by country 
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